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THE LEGAL MONOPOLY
Renee Newman Knake*
Abstract: Lawyers enjoy an exclusive monopoly over their craft, one unlike any other
profession or industry. They bar all others from offering legal representation. In most
jurisdictions, lawyer-judges draft, enact, and enforce their own professional conduct rules as
well as preside over any legal challenge to the rules’ validity. Lawyer regulation purports to
protect the public and preserve professionalism, but it also reduces competition, constrains
information, and maintains artificially high prices. Consequently, much of the American public
goes without help when a lawyer is needed.
Federal antitrust law typically steps in to remedy this sort of pervasive market control,
promoting competition and free markets for the public good. The legal profession, however,
largely avoids antitrust scrutiny because the courts fall into a special exception known as the
“state action doctrine,” permitting anticompetitive actions by governmental bodies to engage
in what otherwise would be illegal, anticompetitive activity. But a key presumption justifying
this exception—that the regulators are not themselves members of the regulated profession or
industry—is not true for most lawyer regulation. Accordingly, this Article proposes applying
federal antitrust law to scrutinize the legal monopoly, and suggests that doing so may increase
access to affordable legal services while preserving professionalism and client protection.
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INTRODUCTION
As much as 80% of the American public goes without a lawyer to
resolve legal problems, primarily due to lack of information and cost.1
This problem, first acknowledged in the 1930s,2 continues nearly a
century later, notwithstanding extensive efforts like expanded legal aid
and pro bono services.3 To understand why, consider the market for legal
services.
High barriers to entry, information asymmetries, and anticompetitive
restrictions are hallmarks of the legal profession. Only lawyers, regulated
exclusively by lawyer-judges in most jurisdictions, may provide legal
representation. The profession justifies this level of self-regulation as
necessary to preserve independence and ensure that the judicial branch
remains a separate check on the executive and legislative branches of
government. At the same time, this regulation prices legal representation
beyond what many individuals can afford, consequently making access to
1. See infra note 195.
2. See Stephen Love, Karl Llewellyn, Osmond Fraenkel & Malcolm Sharp, Economic Security and
the Young Lawyer: Four Views, 32 ILL. L. REV. 662, 663 (1938); Lloyd K. Garrison, et al., Report of
the Special Committee on the Economic Condition of the Bar, 63 A.B.A. REP. 390, 391 (1938)
(“[P]eople in the low income groups frequently go without legal assistance because they cannot afford
to pay for it, or because they think they cannot afford to pay for it, or because they distrust lawyers or
do not know any lawyers, or do not know when they need advice . . . .”).
3. See generally REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, ACCESSING JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA:
FINDINGS FROM THE COMMUNITY NEEDS AND SERVICES STUDY (2014) [hereinafter SANDEFUR,
ACCESSING
JUSTICE],
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2478040
[https://perma.cc/P5LD-NU26].
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justice out of reach.4 It also limits available information so severely that
much of the American public does not realize when a life problem has a
legal solution.5
Federal antitrust law typically breaks up business relationships like
this, where members of an industry or profession act in concert to suppress
competition. Why does the legal profession enjoy such control over the
market for its services? The answer lies in the unique role that lawyerjudges play simultaneously as a regulatory arm of the state and also as
members of the regulated profession.
When the state creates the monopoly or cartel, regulatory constraints
typically are immune from antitrust review under what is known as the
“state-action doctrine.”6 This exemption from antitrust liability is based
upon principles of federalism, state sovereignty, and judicial economy. 7 It
is justified, at least in part, by the belief that publicly accountable officials
will not be influenced by the same financial motivation or other selfinterest as private actors.8 Moreover, state regulatory officials usually
represent a diverse range of backgrounds and experiences. This is not the
case, however, for legal assistance.
In most jurisdictions, the highest courts—made up of judges who
usually are also lawyers—adopt and enforce rules governing who may
practice law and how law may be practiced. Even where these lawyerjudge regulators are presumed nonpartisan by virtue of a committee-based
appointment process or subject to some measure of public accountability
through elections, the fact remains that they are members of the profession
subject to the regulations they enact and enforce.
Consequently, lawyer-judge regulators are vulnerable to capture, both
perceived and actual, because as industry members, they may consciously
or unconsciously advance the commercial or special concerns of their own
profession. Although the judiciary is presumed to act in the public’s
interest, its members are nonetheless part of the legal profession. This
vulnerability ought to remove lawyer regulation from aspects of the state

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See infra notes 38–45 and accompanying text.
7. See S. Paul Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust
Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 703–05 (1973).
8. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45 (1985) (“We may presume, absent a
showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in the public interest. A private party, on the other
hand, may be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own behalf.”); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 27 (1983) (“[R]egulation often is
procured by and designed for the benefit of those the regulation purports to control.”).
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action doctrine. Even if individual lawyers or judges may act to advance
consumer interests over the profession’s interests, capture risks remain.
When members of a profession enact and enforce anticompetitive
regulations as an arm of the state—whether as legislators, the judiciary,
or the executive—dual allegiances exist. As Justice Kennedy cautioned in
the 2015 decision North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC,9
such an arrangement risks that “established ethical standards” will “blend
with private anticompetitive motives in a way difficult for even market
participants to discern.”10 Accordingly, in this sort of circumstance,
limiting antitrust immunity is “most essential.”11
Interestingly, courts do not protect competition only via antitrust law.
In several instances, the U.S. Supreme Court used the First Amendment
to limit anticompetitive regulations when state action immunity would
otherwise protect the regulation from federal antitrust review.12 Economic
constraints long thought well outside the purview of free speech doctrine
have increasingly been struck down on First Amendment grounds,
beginning in the late 1970s with advertising by pharmacists, optometrists,
lawyers, and beyond.13 Thus, the commercial speech doctrine became an
alternative vehicle for striking down anticompetitive state regulation.
The practice of treating competition as commercial speech, however,
is imprecise, failing at times to fully account for the economic and
informational consequences of anticompetitive regulations. Some
scholars argue that this causes undesirable distortion in First Amendment
jurisprudence and threatens to return the country to a Lochner-like era.14
Moreover, the manipulation of free speech principles to reach
anticompetitive state action does not fully account for the potential
complications of capture on a pragmatic level where, as in the case of the
legal profession, the public official administering (and reviewing the

9. 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
10. Id. at 1111, 1116–17 (holding that the state dental board violated antitrust law by issuing ceaseand-desist letters to providers of teeth whitening services).
11. Id. at 1111.
12. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(holding that a blanket ban on advertising violated the First Amendment).
13. See infra notes 96–101 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV.
F. 165, 165–66 (2015) (critiquing the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision striking a licensing requirement
for tour guides on First Amendment grounds and observing that “[u]ntil very recently, it was well
accepted that purely economic regulations are subject to rational basis review. This was the point of
consigning Lochner v. New York to the anti-canon. Since the New Deal, black-letter constitutional
law has authorized the Nation to regulate the complexities of modern economic life in ways designed
to modify the unobstructed operation of the private market” (citations omitted)).
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constitutionality of) the constraint is also a member of the very industry
prospering from it.
This Article is the first to identify these interrelated problems of
substituting the First Amendment to address anticompetitive actions by a
self-regulated state entity, and to propose expanded federal antitrust
review as a solution. This proposal engages important debates within three
areas of legal scholarship—federal antitrust law, First Amendment
jurisprudence, and legal ethics. These debates frame the Article’s
organization.
Part I of this Article describes the origin of the legal monopoly,
explaining how lawyer-judges regulate legal ethics and the practice of
law. Part I also explores the unique concerns presented when the state
official responsible for suppressing competition is a member of the
regulated group, looking in particular at the exceptional situation of courts
as regulators of the legal profession, though this analysis potentially bears
on other professions and industries as well. Here, this Article addresses an
oversight in the commentary on federal antitrust law and state regulation
of the professions and applies capture theory to critique the conflicts of
interest at play when the sovereign regulator is a member of the targeted
group. Part I also examines the evolution of the First Amendment’s
commercial speech doctrine as a tool to address competition constraints
at the state level that would otherwise be unreachable under the state
action doctrine. This Article cautions against reliance upon free speech
doctrine rather than federal antitrust law for striking down anticompetitive
regulations. Such reliance distorts First Amendment jurisprudence and
arbitrarily permits review of some, but not all, anticompetitive state
action.
Part II offers an overview of the interaction between federal antitrust
law and state anticompetitive regulation. Here, this Article discusses
relevant decisions since the U.S. Supreme Court first articulated the state
action doctrine over seventy years ago in Parker v. Brown.15 This
discussion includes the Court’s most recent guidance from North
Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, where the Court held that a state
agency comprised almost entirely of members of a profession—dentists—
could not prohibit outsiders from offering teeth-whitening services,
though the dentists argued this constituted the unlawful practice of
dentistry. In the months following the Court’s decision, at least three
different antitrust challenges were filed in federal district courts by legal

15. 371 U.S. 341 (1943).
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services providers against state bar authorities, an indication that the
questions posed and addressed by this Article are likely to recur.16
Part III proposes limiting antitrust immunity for challenges against
anticompetitive lawyer-judge-made regulations. Here, this Article reflects
upon the goals of federal competition law in the context of the public’s
interest in legal services. This Article proposes that anticompetitive
regulations only should be protected by the “state action doctrine” when
the regulation either (1) cures a market problem to the public’s benefit or
(2) preserves an essential element of professional practice. Striking
anticompetitive professional conduct rules that do not fall into one of
these categories promises to expand access to legal services for large
segments of the American public.
I.

THE LEGAL MONOPOLY

The legal profession is unique in its degree of self-regulation. Lawyerjudge regulators craft and enforce the rules for their own profession
without the elements of public accountability and due process ascribed to
government actors, most notably public elections of disinterested external
individuals and independent judicial review. Capture theory provides
justification for reconsidering how the state action doctrine should be
applied (or, at least, how competition values should be weighed) in the
context of self-regulation.
A.

How Lawyer-Judges Regulate Legal Ethics and the Practice of
Law

Consider the implications of the lawyer-driven regulatory regime. Most
states draw from model ethics rules and policies promulgated by lawyers
elected by their peers to the American Bar Association (“ABA”) House
of Delegates. These lawyers likely have direct financial interest in the
rules that they draft. The drafting and enactment of the model rules and
policies are not subject to external review. The highest court in each state
then bases its body of regulations upon the ABA’s model rules and
policies.17 This process typically occurs behind closed doors, without
16. See infra note 183.
17. It should be noted that in a few states, some regulation of lawyers occurs via the legislature—
this would more clearly fall under the umbrella of state action protection and, assuming the legislature
is not made up entirely of lawyers, is not the subject of my focus here. For example, the states of
Alaska, California, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Virginia, and Wyoming all have
legal authority promulgated by a combination of judicial and legislative powers. NAT’L CONF. OF
BAR EXAM’RS & AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
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public hearings or open meetings, at most with a period for public notice
and comment.18 While one might argue that in states where the members
of the highest courts are elected19 some public accountability is in place,
the fact remains that at all levels of regulation, from drafting to enactment
to enforcement to adjudication, lawyers (or lawyer-judges) hold exclusive
control.20
Despite all of these concerns, federal courts and the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) apply the state action doctrine to the state supreme
courts when acting legislatively because, “[a]s a coordinate branch of the
sovereign exercising a constitutionally prescribed legislative authority,
the state supreme court is entitled to deference in its regulatory choices.”21
This deference is grounded in the courts’ “traditions of independence and
principled decision-making that distinguish them from regulatory

COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 1 (2014); see also CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.1, at 51 (1986) (“Modern lawyer codes plainly are adopted
by courts and legislatures for the purpose of authoritatively measuring a lawyer’s liability to
professional discipline.”).
18. Regarding the closed process for lawyer regulation, see Paul R. Verkuil, State Action, Due
Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 351–54 (1975)
(describing the example of Virginia law, where the Virginia Supreme Court is empowered “to control
and regulate the practice of law” including the authority to “promulgate a code of ethics to govern
attorney conduct” and observing that this sort of “regulation provides no public hearing on minimum
fee schedules and no maximum rate setting”). Regarding the attorney discipline process, see Leslie
C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 19–20 (2007)
(“The extent to which the disciplinary process is private varies from state to state. Only Florida, New
Hampshire, Oregon, and West Virginia treat all or most complaints about lawyers as a matter of public
record. In most other states, the complaint becomes a public record once there has been a finding of
probable cause. In a minority of the jurisdictions, the public cannot attend disciplinary hearings even
after probable cause is found; information about complaints does not become publicly available until
there has been a finding of wrongdoing and a public sanction is imposed.” (internal citations omitted)).
19. Thirty-eight states hold judicial elections at the supreme court level, where the remaining states
utilize a system of appointment usually by an advisory committee. See Joe Palazzolo, Judges Step up
Electioneering as Outside Money Pours in to Races, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/judges-step-up-electioneering-as-outside-money-pours-into-races1413149643 [https://perma.cc/477X-W7L5].
20. At its extreme, when a rule is challenged, plaintiffs are forced to argue their case before the
very officials who enacted the rule. See, e.g., Grievance Adm’r v. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d 123 (Mich.
2006) (lawyer challenging constitutionality of professional conduct rules promulgated by the
Michigan Supreme Court). While beyond the scope of this Article, it is for this reason challengers to
lawyer conduct rules should have the ability to bring their case in federal court where, at least, they
will not be forced to argue the validity of rules before the judges who adopt and enforce them. See
WOLFRAM, supra note 17, § 2.2.1, at 23 (“One uncomfortable consequence is that the same body that
promulgates comprehensive sets of rules regulating the conduct of lawyers must also sit as the body
that determines their validity if later attacked.” (citation omitted)).
21. William H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the
Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618, 637 n.113.

10 - Knake.docx (Do Not Delete)

1300

10/10/2018 5:49 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1293

agencies.”22 Although independence and principled decision-making are
values “largely limited to the decisions of concrete cases, they are closely
related to the court’s authority over the practice of law,”23 so the argument
goes.
Some scholars maintain that courts should “presum[e] . . . as ‘private’
any organization [even a government body] in which a decisive coalition
(usually a majority) is made up of participants in the regulated market,”24
but this is not how the judiciary or other lawyer-regulators have been
treated in antitrust jurisprudence, perhaps because, in essence, judges are
being asked to apply the antitrust law to themselves. Instead, state
supreme courts, comprised of lawyer-judges who apply antitrust law to
regulations adopted and enforced by members of their own profession, are
treated as a sovereign.25 Indeed, courts jump entirely over this threshold
inquiry, skipping ahead to decide whether the challenged regulatory
action is that of the state without examining the composition of the state
actor. Moreover, when lawyer-judges delegate regulatory power to a bar
authority or licensing committee, courts still view the regulator as a
governmental unit even when it is made up of a majority of market
participants.26
Consequently, lawyer regulation enjoys insulation from competition
that, in some instances, may not only compromise consumer interests, but
also may undermine constitutionally protected rights. Numerous
regulations on the practice of law have suppressed competition. For
example:
Minimum fee schedules have kept fees high, unauthorized
practice rules and bar admission standards have limited entry,
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 227, at 226 (4th ed.
2013); see also Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 191–92 (2010) (courts “seek
the central substance of the situation and therefore . . . ‘are moved by the identity of the persons who
act, rather than the label of their hats.’” (citing United States v. Sealy Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 353 (1967))).
“The determination that a[n actor’s] activities constitute state action is not a purely formalistic
inquiry.” Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 39 (1985).
25. Applying the Parker doctrine articulated in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977),
the Court observed “a state supreme court, when acting in a legislative capacity, occupies the same
position as that of a state legislature. Therefore, a decision of a state supreme court, acting legislatively
rather than judicially is exempt from Sherman Act liability as state action.” Hoover v. Ronwin, 466
U.S. 558, 568 (1984) (citations omitted).
26. Id. (observing that “[c]loser analysis is required when the activity at issue is not directly that of
the legislature or supreme court, but is carried out by others pursuant to state authorization,” yet still
finding that a bar regulation banning advertising was protected from antitrust challenge under the
state action doctrine).
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restrictions on advertising and solicitation have reduced
competition and the development of new markets for legal
services, and limitations on nonlawyer ownership of law firms has
reduced capital flow into legal services markets.27
Bar regulators justify any “resulting losses in economic
efficiency . . . on the ground that the restrictive rules prevent more
harmful effects on clients and society.”28 Yet, it is unclear whether these
harmful effects even exist29 and, in any event, “[e]conomists . . . tend to
believe that market efficiency is a net benefit to clients and society and
probably to lawyers as a group.”30
In drafting, adopting, and enforcing the rules applicable to their own
profession, as well as reviewing their validity when subject to a legal
challenge, it is not an overstatement to suggest that members of the
judiciary may suffer from regulatory capture. The public-private
distinction commonly used by the courts to define the contours of the state
action exemption does not fully encompass the range of concerns
presented by anticompetitive regulation in the context of a sovereign
regulating an occupation of which it is also a member, as in the legal
profession.31 This binary public-private dichotomy fails to account for the
range of influences at play, including financial or other self-interest, rentseeking, conflicts, accountability to and pressure from members of one’s
own group, and ethical blind spots such as cognitive bias or groupthink.32
While it may be uncomfortable to contemplate that a particular judge
would regulate or review lawyer regulation in a self-interested or selfdealing way, this may occur without the judge being fully conscious of
it.33 Lawyer-judge self-regulation is also susceptible to conflicts of
interest and pressure from the local professional community.
27. WOLFRAM, supra note 17, § 2.4.1, at 39.
28. Id.
29. See Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Protecting the Profession or the Public?
Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2605–06 (2014).
30. WOLFRAM, supra note 17, § 2.4, at 39; see also Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to
Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2008) [hereinafter Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation]; Deborah L. Rhode,
Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized
Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1981).
31. See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (discussing the
breakdown between public/private rights).
32. See generally MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO
DO WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2011).
33. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1504 (1998) (discussing “suggestive evidence that selfserving bias does affect lawyers and judges”); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 587–88 (1984)
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How might we better refine state action immunity to deal with these
concerns? While some flexibility34 could be helpful to courts evaluating
the application of federal antitrust law to the legal profession, modern
doctrine does not adequately accommodate for this. The theory of
regulatory capture offers a response.
B.

Antitrust and Regulatory Capture

Capture theory would suggest that when the state’s economic choices
are proscribed by a regulatory body that has overtaken the state’s political
system, this process (and perhaps also the choices made within the
process) is both inefficient and illegitimate.35 Occupational regulation has
been long critiqued as an unjustified economic constraint, going back as
far as Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations in the late 1700s.36 Economic
literature over the ages has built upon Smith’s assessment, including the
theory of regulatory capture, which suggests that occupations or other
economic alliances endeavor to enrich themselves through the state’s
power to control competition and price.37
Professor John Shepard Wiley set forth his “capture theory of antitrust
federalism” in a mid-1980s Harvard Law Review article to explain what
he described as the U.S. Supreme Court’s “unpredictable but
unmistakable willingness to subject state regulatory policies to
supervening federal antitrust policy” in the wake of Parker v. Brown.38 In
Parker, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth a special exemption from federal
antitrust law for the states when they enact anticompetitive regulations.39
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that while it may “seem[ ] highly improbable that members of the
profession entrusted by the State Supreme Court with a public obligation to administer an examination
system that will measure applicants’ competence would betray that trust, and secretly subvert that
system to serve their private ends[;] [n]evertheless, the probability that respondent will not prevail at
trial is no justification for dismissing the complaint”).
34. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 699 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (“In my view the decision in Goldfarb . . . properly left to the Court some flexibility in
considering how to apply traditional Sherman Act concepts to professions long consigned to selfregulation.” (citations omitted)).
35. See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3 (1971).
36. For example, Adam Smith argued that the only purpose of mandated apprenticeships in the late
1700s was to suppress competition, with self-regulated professions acting in “conspiracy against the
public” and endeavoring to maintain artificially high prices. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS ch. X, pt. II (George Bell & Sons 1908) (1976).
37. See generally Stigler, supra note 35.
38. John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 714
(1986) [hereinafter Wiley, Capture Theory].
39. Id.
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According to Wiley, this “doctrinal shift has paralleled a theoretical shift
in our conceptions of the nature of regulation itself,” due at least in part to
“a New Deal confidence in market regulation” that “Parker reflected.”40
In the decades following Parker, “however, regulation came to be
regarded as economically inefficient and as the product not of broad
political consensus but of the capture of lawmaking bodies by producer
groups seeking benefit at the expense of others.”41 “This changed attitude
toward regulation” was reflected in a series of decisions by “courts to use
the very state action doctrine that arose from a desire to defer to state
sovereignty as a means to intrude increasingly on that sovereignty.”42
Recognizing the fear of regulatory capture underlying the Court’s
decisions led Wiley to formulate his preferred test for assessing the
competitive effects of state regulation. His theory is grounded in two
goals: first, “distributive justice for consumers”; and second, “economic
efficiency.”43 He contends that one goal of federal antitrust preemption is
to “assure justice for consumers” because “the Sherman Act entitles
consumers to distributive justice: ultimate or household consumers
deserve the surplus they gain from transacting in competitive markets.
When producers appropriate consumer surplus by replacing competition
with cooperation, the Act outlaws their effort.”44
Wiley’s conceptualization of distributive justice for consumers is
relevant to this Article’s project. His assessment of whether
anticompetitive state action should endure contemplates a two-step
inquiry: first, where “a state policy restrains market rivalry,” one must ask
“if the policy is primarily a producer initiative”; and second, if so, the
policy is void if it “hurts consumers by impairing competition without
solving some serious market problem in a way beneficial to them.”45 In
the end, he would “preempt anticompetitive state policies that producers
have captured to the detriment of consumers.”46
40. Id.
41. Id. at 715.
42. Id.
43. John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antirust Federalism: Reply to Professors Page
and Spitzer, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1335 (1988) [hereinafter Wiley, Capture Theory: Reply to
Professors Page and Spitzer]; see also Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 1073 (2007) (“Yet the role of economics in shaping antitrust law has evolved
greatly, especially over the past few decades. The growing influence of economics on antitrust law
can be traced in part to the Chicago School, which, starting in the 1950s, launched a powerful attack
on many antitrust rules and case outcomes that seemed to lack solid economic underpinnings.”).
44. Wiley, Capture Theory: Reply to Professors Page and Spitzer, supra note 43, at 1335–36.
45. Id. at 1336.
46. Id. at 1341.
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Scholars have critiqued capture theory on a number of grounds, though
none hold particular weight here in the context of self-regulation. Some
scholars argue that “[b]ecause regulatory politics are extremely complex,
frequently combining winning coalitions from many different groups, it
is difficult to know when, if ever, the regulatory process has been
captured.”47 In other words, it is difficult to find “direct proof” of
regulatory capture because “legislative histories, such as committee
reports and floor debates, are rarely maintained. Still less common are
records of municipal and administrative deliberation.”48 While this
complexity of coalitions may be true for most regulation moving through
a legislative or administrative rule-making process, this description does
not accurately characterize the process for regulating lawyers—no proof
is needed to demonstrate that lawyer regulation, in most jurisdictions, is
handled almost exclusively by lawyers.
Another critique questions whether “regulation generated by producer
capture is less legitimate than other anticompetitive, inefficient
regulation.”49 Reliance upon capture theory is at times discredited as also
threatening economic efficiency and the political process. In reviewing
antitrust challenges, courts face “a difficult dilemma: how to respect the
political process in the states without frustrating Congress’ purpose in
enacting the Sherman Act.”50 To achieve this balance, courts “focus on
preventing the delegation to private parties of the power to restrain
competition” and “[a]s long as a state retained effective control over the
regulation of its economy, the federal judiciary would honor that state’s
political decision to restrain market forces.”51 Thus, according to critics,
applying capture theory “as the touchstone for preempting state law”
would “overturn[] those results. And that is a role the courts should not
permit antitrust laws to play.”52
This Article conceives of “capture” more narrowly, and as such is not
vulnerable in the same way to these criticisms. For example, among selfregulated professions, no special effort such as lobbying or other external
47. Matthew L. Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism and Rational Choice Political Economy: A Critique
of Capture Theory, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1305 (1988).
48. Page, supra note 21, at 647; id. at 625 (arguing that “judicial intervention is justified when
regulation that conflicts with antitrust exploits an independent defect in the process of representation.
The function of intervention, then, is to resubmit the issue to the state political process for fuller
consideration”).
49. Spitzer, supra note 47, at 1302–03.
50. Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Process,
96 YALE L.J. 486, 518 (1987).
51. Id. at 518–19.
52. Id. at 519.
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pressure is necessary to capture the state regulator ex ante, an effect
labeled by some as “pre-capture.”53 Likewise, no effort is needed to
determine whether the industry influences its regulatory body; the body is
the industry.
Lawyer regulation by its very design operates from a baseline of
capture. The result, inevitably, is a risk that regulation will maximize
economic rents for the profession at the public’s and/or consumer’s
expense. This rent-seeking is evident in an array of professional conduct
rules governing who may practice law (e.g., licensing requirements and
geographic restrictions)54 and how law may be practiced (e.g., bans on
multi-disciplinary practices and outside ownership and investment in law
firms, and limitations on advertising, solicitation, and referrals).55
Nevertheless, might there be good reasons for allowing this inherently
captured regulatory structure to persevere?
C.

Capture of Lawyer-Judge Regulators

The capture of lawyer-judge regulators plays out in unique ways in the
context of the legal profession. On the one hand, lawyers play a special
role in democratic government which, arguably, demands insulation from
regulation by other political branches. On the other hand, the selfregulation necessary for preserving independence can also be vulnerable
to dual allegiances.
1.

The Special Role of Lawyers in a Democracy

Without question, lawyers hold a unique place in society, which may
necessitate some protection for the profession from competitive market
pressures. As scholars observe: “The role of an attorney in navigating and,
when necessary, challenging the law is a critical component of American

53. Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L. & ECON.
453, 486 n.137 (1993) (citing Stigler, supra note 35).
54. The legal profession’s conduct is, in effect, cartel-like “in restricting entry and negotiating
agreements with competing groups.” Rhode, supra note 30, at 4 n.7; see also Walter Gellhorn, The
Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI L. REV. 6, 11 (1976) (“Licensing, imposed ostensibly to
protect the public, almost always impedes only those who desire to enter the occupation or
‘profession;’ those already in practice remain entrenched without a demonstration of fitness or
probity.”).
55. See, e.g., Geoffrey Hazard, Russell Pearce & Jeffrey Stempel, Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed
to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1093 (1983); Rhode,
supra note 30, at 1; Deborah L. Rhode, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An
Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104 (1976).
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democratic government.”56 For example, litigating in the courts “may well
be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of
grievances”57 and lawyers are critical to this process. Lawyers protect
individuals from the excesses of the sovereign58 and “play an
indispensable part in . . . nonviolent means of dispute resolution.”59
Lawyers embody the law. As one scholar explains, they act as:
[A]gents who communicate the rules through advice to private
clients and governments and enable them to organize their
businesses and structure their transactions and comply with
regulations and tax laws and constitutional limitations; and who
can negotiate and if necessary litigate with the state and other
private parties when their claims of rights are impaired or
disputed.60
It is commonly accepted that “[o]ur legal system is premised on the
assumption that law is intended to be known or knowable, that law is in
its nature public information.”61 This means that “[t]he ‘rule of law’ as we
understand it requires promulgation. . . . And one fundamental, well-

56. Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
639, 642–43 (2011) (citing David Luban, Legal Ideals and Moral Obligations: A Comment on Simon,
38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 255, 259 (1996) (“[B]ecause lawyers are often better positioned than
nonlawyers to realize the unfairness or unreasonableness of a law, lawyers often should be among the
first . . . to counsel others that it is acceptable to violate or nullify it.”)); Geoffrey R. Stone, A Lawyer’s
Responsibility: Protecting Civil Liberties in Wartime, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47 (2006) (“It is the
legal profession that is most fundamentally responsible for helping the nation strike the right balance
[between national security and civil liberties] and for defending our freedoms.”).
57. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429–30 (1963) (citations omitted); see also United Mine
Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967) (reinforcing that the First
Amendment protections established in Button extend beyond “political matters of acute social
moment” and that “[g]reat secular causes, with small ones, are guarded” (citations and punctuation
omitted)); Daniel Markovits, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC
AGE 171–211 (2008); id. at 185 (“One might say, then, that what democracy is to political legitimacy
at wholesale, adjudication is to political legitimacy at retail.”).
58. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 348 (6th ed. 1876) (observing
that lawyers are “the most powerful existing security against the excesses of democracy” given “the
authority . . . intrusted [sic] to members of the legal profession, and the influence which these
individuals exercise in the government”).
59. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 19 (3d ed. 2004).
60. Robert W. Gordon, The Role of Lawyers in Producing the Rule of Law: Some Critical
Reflections, 11 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 441, 448 (2010) (“Legal regulations and procedures are
complicated and rapidly changing; so that sophisticated, experienced agents who know their way
around the rule-systems and the courts are generally essential to effective representation within and
operation of the system.”).
61. Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and
Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1547 (1995).
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understood aspect of the lawyer’s role is to be the conduit for that
promulgation.”62
In short, lawyers effectively are the law: “In a complex legal
environment much law cannot be known and acted upon, cannot function
as law, without lawyers to make it accessible to those for whom it is
relevant.”63 Given the special nature of the work that lawyers do as it
relates to the functioning of the legal system and the foundations of
American government, it is not surprising that the state might find it more
efficient to allow the profession to determine its own regulatory standards
rather than look to external sources. Moreover, external regulation64 could
fundamentally compromise the very role that lawyers are meant to fulfill
in the system of democratic checks and balances.65 For these reasons,
some argue that the best balance to be struck is one in which lawyers selfregulate given the intractable relationship with lawyers to law and the
necessity that lawyers not be controlled by other branches of the
government, even in the face of regulatory capture.66
2.

Self-Regulation and Dual Allegiances

Even so, when members of a profession self-regulate, “those who have
the most to gain from reduced consumer welfare in the form of higher
prices are tasked with protecting consumer welfare in the form of health

62. Id.
63. Id. at 1548. For a competing view on the value of a lawyer’s role in selecting information for a
client, see Louis Kaplow & Stephen Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation:
Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 565, 613–14 (1989) (“Our conclusions cast
doubt on the social value of lawyers’ role in selecting information for their clients, thereby challenging
one of the fundamental premises of the legal system.”).
64. External regulation would include state or federal legislative regulations or other control by
authority from outside the legal profession. For further discussion of the distinction between internal
and external regulation of lawyers, see Ted Schneyer, An Interpretation of Recent Developments in
the Regulation of Law Practice, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 559 (2005).
65. See, e.g., James M. Fischer, External Control over the American Bar, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
59, 97 (2006) (the consequence of legislative control “over lawyer practice may come to erode the
ability of lawyers to serve as a bulwark against the aggrandizement of government power vis à vis the
individual”).
66. See Page, supra note 21, at 637 n.113 (“Despite this danger[ ] [of regulatory capture][,] the
extension of the state action exemption to policies of the state supreme court is necessary. As a
coordinate branch of the sovereign exercising a constitutionally prescribed legislative authority, the
state supreme court is entitled to deference in its regulatory choices. Courts have traditions of
independence and principled decisionmaking that distinguish them from regulatory agencies. While
those traditions are largely limited to the decisions of concrete cases, they are closely related to the
court’s authority over the practice of law.”).
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and safety—the fox guards the henhouse.”67 Thus, as other commentators
have observed, we are left to rely upon “an unsupervised group of
competitors appointed to regulate their own profession . . . to neglect their
selfish interests in favor of the state’s.”68 For the judiciary, this is
problematic on multiple levels in that the judiciary not only regulates itself
but also members of the legal profession, of which it also is a part.69
Competition is not the only value at stake; self-regulation by the
judiciary also undermines judicial independence.70 Beyond regulating
themselves, “[t]he multiple institutional, political, and personal
connections between the judiciary and the lawyers they are ostensibly
regulating, as well as the natural inaccessibility of judges to the public,
virtually guarantees lawyers a stranglehold over every aspect of lawyer
regulation.”71 As such, “[i]n this context, the bar is not only working in its
occupational interests, but is also leveraging its close and unique
relationship with its regulators, state judiciaries.”72
D.

Antitrust and the Legal Profession: Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar

For the most part, courts have treated lawyer regulation as protected
state action, without inquiring too deeply into concerns of capture or other
conflicts inherent in this sort of regulatory structure. This is not to say that
67. Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face
Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1140 (2014).
68. Id. at 1143.
69. See, e.g., Page, supra note 21, at 637 n.113 (“It is naive to think that state supreme courts, even
those whose members are appointed, are fully insulated from interest-group pressures. Indeed, the
kinds of considerations developed in section III of this article, suggest that there is a danger that state
courts will enact rules in the interest of the legal profession against the broader consumer interest.
The court is composed of lawyers; it is small in number; and it is in daily contact with the regulated
group.”).
70. See Dana Ann Remus, Just Conduct: Regulating Bench-Bar Relationships, 30 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 123, 147–48 (2011) (observing that judicial codes undermine judicial independence
because they “allow behaviors that may create opportunities and appearances of judicial bias and
partiality” and they “allow the interpretation of ambiguous provisions to be conditioned by bar norms,
which include private interests and private orientations, rather than by independent judicial norms,
which ideally are oriented exclusively toward state and public interests”).
71. Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control
Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1239 (2003)
(arguing that “[l]egislatures, while typically criticized for their accessibility to organized special
interests, would fare better with lawyer regulation than judiciaries” for avoiding the conflicts of
interest and other concerns associated with regulatory capture).
72. Remus, supra note 70, at 147 (arguing that “[b]ar influence over attorney conduct regulation”
not only “raises the specter of regulatory capture” but also presents “an even more worrisome
concern—that the bar will not only capture but more explicitly control and co-opt power from its
regulator, which is itself a branch of government”).

10 - Knake.docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

10/10/2018 5:49 PM

THE LEGAL MONOPOLY

1309

courts blindly endorse all anticompetitive lawyer regulation; for example,
the U.S. Supreme Court has struck down a minimum fee schedule as well
as a rule banning all lawyer advertising.73 In striking these constraints on
competition, the Court’s primary focus was the public’s access to legal
services. Interestingly, however, the Court reached this conclusion by
applying different bodies of law. While antitrust law was used to
scrutinize the fee schedule, the Court turned to the First Amendment for
acting on the advertising ban. This turn to constitutional law is not without
consequence, as explained below, but first some history about the
application of antitrust law to the professions is necessary.
For nearly a century, all professions were considered exempt from
federal antitrust law. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the Sherman
Act’s application to the legal profession for the first time in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar74 where it not only brought the professions under
antitrust review but also found the fee schedule at issue in violation of
federal law.75 While not explicit on the face of the opinion, Wiley’s
capture theory helps explain and justify the Court’s decision.76
The Fairfax County Bar Association (“FCBA”) argued in Goldfarb that
federal antitrust law was “never intended to include the learned
professions.”77 The Bar took the position that “competition is inconsistent
with the practice of a profession because enhancing profit is not the goal
of professional activities; the goal is to provide services necessary to the
community.”78 The Court declined to extend a blanket Sherman Act
exemption for the legal profession,79 instead examining the specific
anticompetitive behavior at issue and applying Parker’s state action
doctrine.80

73. See Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 27 (“The ‘ethical’ requirement that lawyers charge minimum
fees, at issue in Goldfarb, was seen as a simple cartel; . . . the ban on attorneys’ advertising in Bates
appeared as a way to jack up prices by denying clients information about the identity of low-priced
attorneys. Justices convinced that state regulation was in the interest of the firms at the expense of
consumers were reluctant to give antitrust blessings to the results.”); Janet F. Bently et al., Bar
Association Minimum Fee Schedules and the Antitrust Laws, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1164 (1974).
74. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
75. Id. at 791–92.
76. See Wiley, Capture Theory, supra note 38, at 727 (“The Goldfarb Court echoed the capture
notion that regulation serves industry ends, for instance, when it referred to the attorney minimum fee
schedule at issue as ‘essentially a private anticompetitive activity’—even though state law enforced
the schedule.” (citation omitted)).
77. Goldfarb, 412 U.S. at 786.
78. Id. (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 787.
80. Id. at 788.
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Goldfarb involved a challenge by a husband and wife purchasing a
home.81 They could not find an attorney to assist with their title
examination who would accept a fee lower than the minimum fee
schedule published by the FCBA.82 They contacted thirty-six attorneys;
nineteen replied but refused to offer their services.83 The schedule was not
enforced by the FCBA, but the Virginia State Bar, an administrative
agency of the Virginia Supreme Court, had officially condoned fee
schedules and opined that they could not be ignored.84 Indeed, one opinion
went so far as to provide “that ‘evidence that an attorney habitually
charges less than the suggested minimum fee schedule adopted by his
local bar Association raises a presumption that such lawyer is guilty of
misconduct.’”85 Yet, according to the lower court, “although the fee
schedule and enforcement mechanism substantially restrained
competition among lawyers, publication of the schedule by the County
Bar was outside the scope” of federal review.86
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and, Justice Burger, writing for a
unanimous Court, observed: “The nature of an occupation, standing alone,
does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act, nor is the publicservice aspect of professional practice controlling in determining whether
[the Act] includes professions.”87 Moreover, he explained: “In the modern
world it cannot be denied that the activities of lawyers play an important
part in commercial intercourse, and that anticompetitive activities by
lawyers may exert a restraint on commerce.”88 As such, the Court had no
trouble finding that attorneys are not, simply by virtue of being a learned
profession, removed from the Sherman Act’s reach.89 Consequently, the
Virginia State Bar along with the FCBA found themselves liable for a

81. Id. at 775.
82. Id. at 776.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 776–77.
85. Id. at 777–78.
86. Id. at 775.
87. Id. at 787 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 788.
89. Id. at 790 (“The threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action
of the type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is whether the activity is required by the State
acting as sovereign. . . . Here we need not inquire further into the state-action question because it
cannot fairly be said that the State of Virginia [sic] through its Supreme Court Rules required the
anticompetitive activities of either respondent.”); id. at 791 (“It is not enough that . . . anticompetitive
conduct is ‘prompted’ by state action; rather, anticompetitive activities must be compelled by
direction of the State acting as a sovereign.”).
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$200,000 settlement, reached after the case was remanded to the district
court and paid from an assessment levied upon the bar members.90
At the same time, however, the Court acknowledged that professional
regulatory bodies might warrant special treatment under federal antitrust
law:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as
distinguished from a business is, of course, relevant in
determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman
Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as
interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically
to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in
other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the
professions, may require that a particular practice, which could
properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another
context, be treated differently.91
Strikingly, the opinion contains no mention that the justices themselves
and the judges reviewing the matter in the courts below, as well as the
regulators setting the challenged price schedule and issuing legal opinions
about it, were all members of the regulated profession. The only
distinction between lawyers and other professions mentioned by the Court
went to lawyer exceptionalism, offering additional support for upholding
future economic constraints:
The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great
since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function
of administering justice, and have historically been ‘officers of
the courts.’ In holding that certain anticompetitive conduct by
lawyers is within the reach of the Sherman Act we intend no
diminution of the authority of the State to regulate its
professions.92
Goldfarb opened the door to federal antitrust review for state regulation
of the professions, but in later cases the U.S. Supreme Court declined to
extend the reasoning for limiting antitrust immunity to challenges against
the state supreme court itself rather than an entity like the Virginia State
Bar. Significantly—and the significance of this point cannot be
overstated—the Court continued to review anticompetitive professional
regulations even when mandated directly by the state supreme court. But
rather than applying federal antitrust law, the Court turned to the First
Amendment. However, in doing so, the Court made a fateful choice,

90. WOLFRAM, supra note 17, § 2.4, at 40 n.29.
91. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788 n.17.
92. Id. at 792–93 (citations omitted).
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inserting the sort of economic analysis typically reserved for antitrust
matters into the scope of the First Amendment.
E.

Commercial Speech Doctrine and the Legal Profession: Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona

Justifications for free competition often mirror justifications for free
speech,93 particularly when the Court focuses upon the public’s interest in
information.94 Thus, on occasion, litigants (and the courts) have turned to
the First Amendment when they cannot achieve the desired result for
maximizing competition via antitrust doctrine. The U.S. Supreme Court
has used economic competition (and, implicitly, concerns about producer
capture95) as a basis to strike down numerous regulations banning truthful
information from reaching the consumer market, starting in the mid-1970s
with abortion procedures,96 prescription drugs,97 and legal services,98

93. Fred S. McChesney, Commercial Speech in the Professions: The Supreme Court’s
Unanswered Questions and Questionable Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 48 (1985) (“In deciding
whether to grant constitutional protection to particular types of professional promotion, the
Supreme Court has not relied on traditional first amendment analysis. Rather, the Court in evolving
its commercial speech doctrine has looked to many of the same interests protected by antitrust and
consumer protection law.”).
94. For example, in rejecting independence and professionalism as a justification for a ban on
advertising, the Virginia Pharmacy Court was especially concerned in that “the State’s protectiveness
of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their being kept in ignorance.” Va. State Bd.
of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 769 (1976); see also 44 Liquormart v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (“The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical
of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own
good.”); Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s Mistakes:
The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
1303, 1337 (2009) (noting that keeping citizens in ignorance “is as threatening to core democratic
values as the suppression of any speaker”).
95. See, e.g., Wiley, Capture Theory, supra note 38, at 756–57 (noting that in Central Hudson Gas
& Electrical Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), the “electric utilities that
successfully challenged this anticompetitive state restraint could have argued plausibly that it was the
product of producer capture, but the decision’s first amendment framework caused the Court to review
the advertising limitation without considering capture or any other antitrust state action issue”).
96. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975).
97. Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 764–65.
98. See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988) (holding that categorical ban on directmail solicitation targeting potential clients with specific legal claims violates First Amendment);
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (holding that categorical ban on lawyer
advertising violates the First Amendment).
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followed more recently by an array of other kinds of information ranging
from utility promotions,99 to commercial handbills,100 to liquor prices.101
As one scholar explained in writing about commercial speech and
deceptive advertising, the Court’s initial motivation for “extending first
amendment protection to some forms of advertising occasionally implied
that the risk of successful persuasion—even if that persuasion might be
irrational, or might have socially harmful consequences—could not be a
constitutional basis for restricting advertising.”102 In later cases,
“[h]owever, the Court subsequently (without discussing its earlier
statements) adopted what is apparently a more flexible standard, stating
that even nondeceptive advertising could be prohibited whenever the
prohibition would serve a ‘substantial’ state interest, as long as the
prohibition was no broader than necessary to serve that interest.”103 This
expansion of the commercial speech doctrine to a “more flexible
standard” coincides with the Court’s use of the First Amendment to
review the competitive impact of professional conduct regulations which
otherwise would be unreachable under the state action doctrine.
Lawyers and the clients who need them rely heavily upon the speech
of lawyers—courtroom advocacy, written briefs and opinions, intimate
advice, counseling, and more. Lawyers’ speech has been described as “not
only central to what the legal system is all about, and not only the product
of the law as we know it, but basically the only thing that lawyers and the
legal system have.”104 Nearly every rule of professional conduct
governing the practice of law touches upon what a lawyer may, or may
not, say. Lawyers cannot reveal client confidences.105 They must be
circumspect in disclosures to the media during a pending trial.106 Lawyers
walk a fine line in counseling a client about good faith challenges to
existing laws.107 For many years lawyers could not advertise, and, in most
jurisdictions, lawyers remain rather constrained in their ability to advertise

99. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
100. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 424–25 (1993).
101. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996).
102. Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 667 n.28 (1985)
(citing Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1977); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770).
103. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 and Bates, 433 U.S. at 384).
104. Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV. 687, 688
(1996) (“As lawyers, speech is our stock in trade.”).
105. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
106. See id. r. 3.6.
107. See id. r. 1.2.
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and solicit clients.108 They must heed restrictions on their ability to
criticize the judiciary.109 Indeed, when attorneys take their oath, they
sacrifice certain free speech rights enjoyed by the public.
Despite these numerous limitations on lawyers’ speech, the First
Amendment has also been used to protect attorney advice and advocacy
as political speech, particularly when access to legal representation is at
stake.110 In the context of challenges to restrictions viewed as anticompetitive, however, the Court has applied the commercial speech rubric
rather than political speech analysis.
In Bates v. Arizona State Bar,111 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down
a universal ban on lawyer advertising and, in so doing, recognized “the
right of the public as consumers and citizens to know about the activities
of the legal profession.”112 Notably, the Court relied upon commercial
speech doctrine, rather than antitrust law, to reach what essentially was a
conclusion about free competition, not free speech. The Court quickly
dismissed the antitrust claims based upon the state action doctrine.
A close review of the majority’s opinion suggests that the result was
driven largely by competition values rather than free speech interests.
Two recently licensed attorneys, Bates and O’Steen, published a simple
newspaper advertisement describing routine legal services at set fees, such
as uncontested divorces, wills, and name changes.113 The Arizona State
Bar banned all such advertising on the grounds that this helped maintain
a professional image for lawyers, and protected the public from
unnecessary litigation or misleading communications.114 The Court

108. See id. r. 7.1–7.3.
109. See id. r. 3.5.
110. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428, 439 (1963) (holding that the First Amendment
protects the “right of the NAACP and its members and lawyers to associate for the purpose of assisting
persons who seek legal redress for infringements of their constitutionally guaranteed and other rights”
and observing that “a State may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore
constitutional rights”); Bhd of R.R. Trainmen v. Va. State Bar, 337 U.S 1, 8 (1964) (extending the
holding of Button to legal advice and representation beyond the civil rights context); United Mine
Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 221–22 (1967) (holding “that the
freedom of speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
gives . . . the right to hire attorneys . . . to assist . . . in the assertion of . . . legal rights”); United
Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971) (observing that “meaningful access to
the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment”); Legal Servs. Corp.
v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546 (2001); Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First
Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 639, 642–43 (2011).
111. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
112. Id. at 358 (quoting In re Bates, 555 P.2d 640, 648 (Ariz. 1976) (Holohan, J., dissenting)).
113. Id. at 353–55.
114. Id. at 368, 372.
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rejected the Bar’s professionalism concerns and instead elevated the
public’s need for information. The Court suggested that the lack of
advertising “reflect[ed] the profession’s failure to reach out and serve the
community.”115 The Court described its First Amendment analysis in
language of competition and economic freedom:
Advertising is the traditional mechanism in a free-market
economy for a supplier to inform a potential purchaser of the
availability and terms of exchange. The disciplinary rule at issue
likely has served to burden access to legal services, particularly
for the not-quite-poor and the unknowledgeable. A rule allowing
restrained advertising would be in accord with the bar’s
obligation to facilitate the process of intelligent selection of
lawyers, and to assist in making legal services fully available.116
Thus the commercial speech analysis in Bates (and its progeny117) turns
on similar factors as would an antitrust analysis, allowing the Court to
achieve a pro-competitive result even where the state action doctrine
otherwise exempts the economic restriction from scrutiny.118 Despite the
First Amendment’s application in Bates, this constitutional argument has
had less traction when concerned with economic constraints on who may
practice law, as opposed to how law may be practiced. For example, lower
courts have refused to find a First Amendment right to have an unlicensed

115. Id. at 370.
116. Id. at 376–77 (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (applying First Amendment commercial speech
protection to lawyer advertising); Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S 626, 651–52
(1985) (holding that disciplinary rules could mandate disclosure regarding payment of costs in
advertisement, but that First Amendment protected attorney so long as advertisement was truthful and
nondeceptive); Peel v. Att’y Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 100 (1990)
(applying First Amendment commercial speech protection to lawyer advertising).
118. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, California Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission: The
Revenge of Footnote 17, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 265, 286–87 (2000) (“The seminal commercial
speech cases—Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. and
Bates—turned on an analysis of the impact on consumers of banning advertising, just as would an
antitrust analysis of an advertising ban. Indeed, commentators noted the identity of antitrust and first
amendment analysis. Under either antitrust law or the first amendment, a restraint based on protection
of the economic interests of any group, including professionals, would not stand.”).
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layperson represent an individual in court119 or a right to have non-lawyers
practice in partnership with lawyers.120
The outcome of Bates raises the question of whether the First
Amendment should be used to reach anticompetitive activity that state
action immunity would otherwise protect. If the answer is yes, that the
Court will examine the competitive constraint as it did in Bates, then why
not simply use antitrust law? One concern might be the sanctioning;
public officials and regulatory volunteers might be less willing to engage
in government service if they repeatedly face the threat of treble damages
and attorney’s fees as antitrust remedies.121 States could, of course, opt to
indemnify and/or defend against Sherman Act violations, an observation
made by the Court in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v.
FTC.122 Another concern is that professions are special, needing
protection from competition in order to function as society and democracy

119. See Turner v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 478 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (citations omitted)
(“The Plaintiffs have also attempted to couch their right to have unlicensed laymen represent them in
Court in terms of the first amendment. Their argument is that the first amendment guarantees the
freedom of association and right to petition their government for redress of grievances. An alliance
between a defendant, or plaintiff for that matter, and an unlicensed layman for the purpose of litigation
in Court is an association which has as its end the redress of grievances. Hence, the argument goes,
the first amendment guarantees the right of the Plaintiffs to have unlicensed attorneys in
Court. . . . What this Court is holding is that the Constitution of the United States, in particular the
First and Sixth Amendments, does not grant to the Plaintiffs the right to have an unlicensed layman
represent them in Court proceedings.”).
120. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 544 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“A State may
forbid one without a license to practice law as a vocation, but I think it could not stop an unlicensed
person from making a speech about the rights of man or the rights of labor, or any other kind of right,
including recommending that his hearers organize to support his views. Likewise, the state may
prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an occupation without its license, but I do not think it could make
it a crime publicly or privately to speak urging persons to follow or reject any school of medical
thought.”); Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1386 (7th Cir. 1992).
121. Indeed, Justice Scalia raised this concern in the context of the legal profession during oral
argument in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28–
29, N.C. State. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (No. 13-504);
see also Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2005)
(citing William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. &
ECON. 247 (1985)) (noting the problems associated with treble damages in other antitrust contexts
such as predatory pricing). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1 (1984).
122. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1115 (2015)
(citation omitted).
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require.123 If the answer is no, that in Bates the Court got it wrong124 and
that the First Amendment should not be used to undo competitive
restraints where the state action doctrine would prevent the reach of
federal antitrust law, then much of what has been established as protected
commercial speech would be threatened.
F.

The Consequences of Substituting Commercial Speech Doctrine for
Competition Law: Distortion and Arbitrary Review

The concerns highlighted by capture theory continue to resurface via
challenges on constitutional and competition grounds,125 and capture
theory reveals a critical disparity where cases involving the same
competition concerns that motivated the Bates Court go unaddressed
because a free speech issue is not involved. A divided opinion from the
U.S. Supreme Court in Hoover v. Ronwin126 applying the state action
123. See discussion supra section I.C.1. But see Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 598–99 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In any event, there is true irony in the Court’s reliance on these concerns.
In essence, the Court is suggesting that a special protective shield should be provided to lawyers
because they—unlike bakers, engineers, or members of any other craft—may not have sufficient
confidence in the ability of our legal system to identify and reject unmeritorious claims to be willing
to assume the ordinary risks of litigation associated with the performance of civic responsibilities. I
do not share the Court’s fear that the administration of bar examinations by court-appointed lawyers
cannot survive the scrutiny associated with rather ordinary litigation that persons in most other walks
of life are expected to endure. . . . The Court also no doubt believes that lawyers—or at least those
leaders of the bar who are asked to serve as bar examiners—will always be faithful to their fiduciary
responsibilities. Though I would agree that the presumption is indeed a strong one, nothing in the
sweeping language of the Sherman Act justifies carving out rules for lawyers inapplicable to any other
profession. In Goldfarb we specifically rejected such parochialism. Indeed, the argument that it is
unwise or unnecessary to require the petitioners to comply with the Sherman Act is simply an attack
upon the wisdom of the longstanding congressional commitment to the policy of free markets and
open competition embodied in the antitrust laws.” (citation and internal punctuation omitted)).
124. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 778 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“I continue
to believe that this Court took a wrong turn with Bates v. State Bar of Arizona . . . and that it has
compounded this error by finding increasingly unprofessional forms of attorney advertising to be
protected speech. . . . In my view, the States have the broader authority to prohibit commercial speech
that, albeit not directly harmful to the listener, is inconsistent with the speaker’s membership in a
learned profession and therefore damaging to the profession and society at large.”).
125. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 35,
Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of the First, Second, Third and Fourth Dep’ts, App. Div.
of the Sup. Ct. of N.Y., 118 F. Supp. 3d 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 1:11-CV-3387-LAK) (“Jacoby &
Meyers wishes to expand its operations, hire additional attorneys and staff, acquire new technology,
and improve its physical offices and infrastructure to increase its ability to serve its existing clients
and to attract and retain new clients and qualified attorneys. Notably, Jacoby & Meyers’ business
plans principally concern expansion within communities in which working-class, blue-collar and
immigrant families reside.”).
126. 466 U.S. 558 (1984); see also Edlin & Haw, supra note 67, at 1141 (arguing that Hass v. Or.
State Bar, 883 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1989), was wrongly decided because the court “analogize[d]
licensing boards to municipalities because boards are ‘public,’ citing open meetings, public-minded
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doctrine to admission to practice requirements is one example of this
disparity. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and White, offered
in his dissent a lengthy discussion about the concerns of capture
associated with regulation that is enacted, enforced, and reviewed by
members of the regulated profession.
In Hoover v. Ronwin, Edward Ronwin failed the Arizona bar
examination and then argued that Arizona Supreme Court’s Committee
on Examinations and Admissions was “artificially reducing the numbers
of competing attorneys in the State of Arizona” by setting the grading
scale in accordance with the number of attorneys that the Committee
deemed appropriate “rather than with reference to some ‘suitable’ level of
competence.”127 The majority summarily dismissed his argument,
explaining as follows:
Our holding is derived directly from the reasoning of Parker and
Bates. Those cases unmistakably hold that, where the action
complained of—here the failure to admit Ronwin to the Bar—
was that of the State itself, the action is exempt from antitrust
liability regardless of the State’s motives in taking the action.128
The Court did not conduct a Bates-type analysis because Ronwin did not
present a First Amendment challenge.
Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and White, dissenting, questioned the
majority’s blind deference to the state action doctrine: “When
[state] . . . authority is delegated to those with a stake in the competitive
conditions within the market, there is a risk that public power will be
exercised for private benefit.”129 Recognizing the concern of capture, they
observed that “[a] potential conflict arises, however, whenever
government delegates licensing power to private parties whose economic

mandates, and an affiliation with the state. . . [and] fail[ed] to recognize that these features cannot
meaningfully check self-dealing in the way that elections and public visibility check municipal
officers from self-dealing at the expense of their constituents” (footnote omitted)).
127. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 565.
128. Id. at 579–80. The majority characterized the admission denial as an act of the Arizona
Supreme Court, rather than a state agency. See id. at 588 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s
conclusion that the challenged action was that of the Arizona Supreme Court is, however, plainly
wrong. Respondent alleged that the decision to place an artificial limit on the number of lawyers was
made by petitioners—not by the State Supreme Court.”). The dissent found significant the fact that
the admission decision was made by a body with authority delegated by the court. See id. at 590 (“The
fact that petitioners are part of a state agency under the direction of the sovereign is insufficient to
cloak them in the sovereign’s immunity; that much was also decided in Goldfarb.”). Capture theory
would question the anticompetitive effect of the decision whether by the court or a delegated
authority.
129. Id. at 585.
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interests may be served by limiting the number of competitors who may
engage in a particular trade.”130
The Court’s expansion of the First Amendment to cover commercial
speech over the years has resulted in what scholars call “an eclectic
approach,” with a “diversity of speech” warranting constitutional status
leading to a complexity that “[j]udges and commentators have been
understandably reluctant to admit.”131 Not only is the Court’s use of free
speech principles to reach free competition complex, it is controversial
and arguably unfounded. Other commentators observe that while,
“disallowing state interference with commercial advertising serves other
values that merit careful legislative consideration—aggregate economic
efficiency and consumer opportunity to maximize utility in a free
market—these values are not appropriate for judicial vindication under
the first amendment.”132
Thus, rather than manipulate the First Amendment, courts might return
to antitrust law—the body of law designed to further consumer interests
in a free market and revisit the theoretical underpinnings supporting the
state action exemption. Capture theory “offers a means for the Court to
achieve the results of the commercial speech cases without embedding
those results within the antimajoritarianism of the first amendment.”133 As
such, “those who criticize recent commercial speech cases for employing
constitutional efficiency analysis should welcome capture preemption
under the Sherman Act.”134
Relying on the First Amendment to assess economic constraints creates
a haphazard, arbitrary system of judicial review. While a number of
scholars propose antitrust solutions to address the concerns associated
130. Id. at 584.
131. Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1282 (1984) (observing that the “exploration
of the relationship of the first amendment to economic regulation yields a valuable perspective on
first amendment law”); id. at 1251 (concluding that the Supreme Court applies a “general balancing
methodology or an eclectic approach” to the First Amendment).
132. Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process
and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1979) (“In our view, the first amendment guarantee
of freedom of speech and press protects only certain identifiable values. Chief among them is selfgovernment. Additionally, the first amendment may protect the opportunity for individual selffulfillment through free expression. Neither value is implicated by governmental regulation of
commercial speech. Thus the justifications supporting judicial abrogation of political choice to uphold
the guarantees of the first amendment do not extend to commercial speech.”).
133. Wiley, Capture Theory, supra note 38, at 779.
134. Id. at 779 n.307 (claiming that “the Sherman Act is a preferable substitute for the first
amendment if one believes that commercial speech cases place efficiency reasoning in an illegitimate
constitutional context”).
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with regulatory capture for the professions generally, but none recognizes
the special situation of lawyer regulation.135 Specific to the legal
profession’s inherent regulatory bias—but outside of the ambit of antitrust
law—recommendations have been made to place regulatory authority in
the legislature rather the courts,136 and to increase education of the
judiciary and the profession about the implications of regulatory
capture.137 These recommendations, however, have proven unlikely to
result in any meaningful change.
A better solution is to calibrate antitrust immunity for state action
according to the level of disinterest of the state actor. Part II explains the
contours of the state action doctrine and lays the groundwork for applying

135. One scholar would remove from state action protection any regulations enacted by regulatory
bodies comprised of members who have financial interests at stake in the economic constraint at issue.
See Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667, 672 (1991)
(“[A]ntitrust stands for the . . . limited proposition that those who stand to profit financially from
restraints of trade cannot be trusted to determine which restraints are in the public interest and which
are not.”). Others “would look to the actual accountability of the [regulatory body] to determine when
there is an appreciable risk that the challenged conduct may be the product of parties pursuing their
own interests rather than state policy” and “would find that such risk is present whenever the entity
consists in whole or in part of market participants and certainly where the entity is dominated by
market participants.” Edlin & Haw, supra note 67, at 1142 (citations and internal punctuation omitted)
(building upon the FTC’s argument in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners). In other
words, they would apply both Midcal prongs to “all practitioner-dominated boards . . . regardless of
the appointment process.” Id. at 1144. They recognize the significant consequences of this position,
however: “Most licensing boards would fail the supervision prong if subjected to it; requiring state
supervision for licensing boards that claim state action immunity creates the potential for sweeping
changes to regulations affecting over a third of the nation’s workforce. Id. Another proposal would
emphasize “permissive certification and mandatory registration.” Gellhorn, supra note 54, at 26
(“Engaging in the occupation without a license, or obtaining it by misrepresentation, would be made
a serious offense, in order to stimulate prompt and accurate registration.”); see also Page, supra note
21, at 660 (advocating a “clear-statement approach” to resolve “the problem of capture”). Of course,
it would also be possible to simply strip the professions of the common-law Parker exemption
entirely, though, as a practical matter, this is unlikely to occur given the degree of entrenchment the
state action doctrine currently enjoys.
136. See generally BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM (2011). This is similar to Gellhorn’s proposal for a regulatory body “not linked with an
occupational group . . . created to receive complaints against licensees, investigate them and, if
objectionable conduct is found, initiate proceedings looking toward revocation, suspension, or other
appropriate discipline by a court or a special tribunal.” Gellhorn, supra note 54, at 26–27 (“A plan of
this nature would, I believe, end the present abuse of licensure that services selfish interests by
constricting occupational freedom.”).
137. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Kessler, The Unchanging Face of Legal Malpractice: How the
“Captured” Regulators of the Bar Protect Attorneys, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 457, 499 (2002) (observing
that the legal “profession has been willfully blind to the danger of over identification with the business
of lawyering. The institutions have been captured, but they remain unaware of their lack of neutrality.
The solution to capture is education. Capture may never be eliminated; however, a judiciary that is
aware of its biases can control them”).
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a limited antitrust review to professional conduct rules created by lawyerjudges for the legal profession.
II.

STATE ACTION AND ANTITRUST IMMUNITY

Federal antitrust laws have been called “the Magna Carta of free
enterprise” and described “as important to the preservation of economic
freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the
protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.”138 Their origin dates
back to 1890,139 when Congress passed the Sherman Act through the
purview of the Commerce Clause to prevent certain business
relationships, including cartels and monopolies, from seizing control of
too much of the economy.140 The Sherman Act is meant to be:
[A] comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and greatest
material progress, while at the same time providing an
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic
political and social institutions.141
The law provides for criminal sanctions and treble damages as well as
attorney fees for a successful challenge, which may be brought by the U.S.
Department of Justice, the FTC, or private parties.142
Two different standards govern potential antitrust violations. Some
activities like price-fixing or group boycotts are deemed illegal per se;
other endeavors, such as monopolistic behavior, are scrutinized under the
rule-of-reason, i.e., whether their purpose, operation, and effect are an
unreasonable restraint on trade. To determine whether federal antitrust
law will preempt a state law constraining competition, courts first ask
138. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 111 (1980) (quoting
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)).
139. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1–7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)). In June of 1890, the United States Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust
Act. Id. Senator John Sherman (R-OH) authored the Act, which passed the Senate 51-1, 21 CONG.
REC. 3153 (1890), and the House of Representatives 242-0, 21 CONG. REC. 6314 (1890).
140. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. John Sherman). Section I of the Sherman Act
prohibits contracts or conspiracies in restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1. Section II prevents monopolies
or attempts to monopolize. Id. § 2.
141. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
142. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890). The Clayton Act, enacted in 1914,
extended the right to sue under the antitrust laws to the Federal Trade Commission. Clayton Act, Pub.
L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27).
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whether the state law “mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily
constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases, or . . . places
irresistible pressure on a private party to violate the antitrust laws in order
to comply with the statute.”143 If so, the court will then determine whether
the state law nonetheless is protected from federal preemption.144
A.

Anticompetitive State Regulation Typically is Exempt from Federal
Antitrust Review

The command of federal antitrust law does not apply to state sovereigns
directly engaged in regulatory action because of the judge-made state
action doctrine,145 first articulated by the Supreme Court in Parker v.
Brown. “The doctrine rests on the notion that, although Congress might
have the power to displace certain forms of state regulation, it did not wish
to do so,”146 and is likely grounded in federalism and state sovereignty
concerns although the legislative history is silent.147 Indeed, the legislative
history “contains no reference to the applicability of the act to those areas
likely to be exempt . . . such as law, medicine, or other ‘learned
professions.’”148 To be sure, state governments must have freedom to
legislate in ways where wealth is distributed by regulatory structures
rather than free competition. Taken to the extreme, were the Sherman Act
applied broadly, states would largely lose much of their authority.149
The state action doctrine’s application has inspired a well-developed
(albeit confusing150) body of literature, yet no final consensus has emerged
as to the rationale for exempting professional associations from antitrust
law or to the methodology for applying any such exemption. This is
143. Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982).
144. Id.
145. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, STATE ACTION PRACTICE MANUAL 1
(2000).
146. 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 215a, at 339 (3d ed. 2006).
147. See Spitzer, supra note 47, at 1293, 1295 (“The legislative history of the Sherman Act provides
no guidance for creating a state action doctrine.”)
148. Note, The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other “Non-Commercial”
Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 313, 321 (1972).
149. See David McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism,
Petitioning, and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 356–57 (1994) (“If the
Sherman Act, with its national mandate for competitive markets, were applied to all state regulations
it would pose a serious threat to the states’ very existence as meaningful government entities.”).
150. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 135, at 674 (“Although the series of cases establishing
this . . . multi-tier immunity has settled some of the many doctrinal issues raised by state action
immunity, the doctrine has continued to spawn more confusion and litigation than certainty.”).
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especially true for the legal profession which enjoys a unique level of selfregulation. While a handful of commentators have addressed the antitrust
implications of occupational licensing and industry self-regulation in a
variety of areas,151 none has fully explored the concerns about competition
in the arena of lawyer regulation.152 This lack of attention to the legal
profession’s exceptional regulatory structure makes it a particularly good
case study for evaluating when, if ever, antitrust immunity ought to be
limited where the sovereign itself holds membership in the regulated
group.
This is not to say that states should be allowed to rubberstamp
privately-driven economic constraints absent some sort of governmental
justification. As commentators have noted, “[t]his is certainly not what
the Court (or anyone else for that matter) has in mind when it speaks of
the states as sovereign regulators, and allowing liability for such open
defiance does not threaten the proper role of states in the federal
system.”153 On one hand, the Court has said that “[t]he reason that state
action is immune from Sherman Act liability is not that the State has
chosen to act in an anticompetitive fashion, but that the State itself has
chosen to act.”154 In other words, the state action exemption does not apply
“only if the sovereign acted wisely after full disclosure from its
subordinate officers. The only requirement is that the action be that of the
‘state acting as a sovereign.’”155 On the other hand, the Court also has said:
The national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by
casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement. As Parker teaches,
‘a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman
Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their
action is lawful . . . .’156
In theory, then, the point of removing so-called “state action” from the
ambit of antitrust regulation is to respect governmental economic
decisions where limits on competition are required to achieve some other
151. See, e.g., Gellhorn, supra note 54, at 11; Edlin & Haw, supra note 67, at 1154–56; Elhauge,
supra note 135, at 725.
152. Their work, discussed below in Part III, is helpful background for the inquiry here, though
their conclusions fail to fully embrace the exceptional situation faced by the legal profession, where
a sovereign, i.e., lawyer-judges acting as legislators, craft the regulations regarding who may enter
profession and how the profession may be practiced.
153. See McGowan & Lemley, supra note 149, at 357.
154. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 574 (1984).
155. Id.
156. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980) (citing
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943)).
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public good (though again, under modern doctrine, a state need not
demonstrate this to enjoy immunity—that the state acts is thought to be
sufficient, without examination into motive157).
What constitutes state action for purposes of antitrust exemption,
however, is not entirely clear, unless the legislature, executive, or
judiciary (acting legislatively) has explicitly enacted the regulation.158
When the state delegates its regulatory authority to an agency or
association, courts struggle to apply the exemption, especially where the
body is made up of private participants in the regulated group.159 For
decades it was widely assumed that federal antitrust law did not even
apply to state regulation of the learned professions like physicians and
lawyers.160 Not until the 1970s did this view change, when the Court held
that a minimum fee schedule promulgated by a county bar association
violated the Act, as discussed above in section I.D.161
B.

Private Interests May Also Be Exempt, If Directed by the State

California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc.162 supplies the test that courts currently apply when private actors
engage in anti-competitive behavior at the direction of the state: they will
be exempt if the challenged behavior is “clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy” and the policy is “actively
157. See WILLIAM C. HOLMES & MELISSA H. MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK 810
(2013-2014 ed. 2013) (“[A]ttempts were made to carve out special immunity exceptions where the
state or local government officials approving the conduct allegedly acted in ‘bad faith’ or for ‘corrupt
motives’ or where the officials ‘conspired’ to serve the interests of private parties rather than the
public interest. These attempts were soundly rejected by the Supreme Court in City of Columbia v.
Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.”).
158. See, e.g., Hoover, 466 U.S. at 569 (“When the conduct is that of the sovereign itself, on the
other hand, the danger of unauthorized restraint of trade does not arise. Where the conduct at issue is
in fact that of the state legislature or supreme court, we need not address the issues of ‘clear
articulation’ and ‘active supervision.’”); Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 107
F.3d 1026, 1036 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating where “the states are sovereign in imposing the [challenged
economic constraint], the clear articulation and active supervision requirements . . . are
inapplicable”).
159. See John Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the “State-Municipal Action” Antitrust Cases, 61
TEX. L. REV. 481, 484 (1982) (“[N]either the courts nor myriad commentators have been able to
dispel the confusion and conflict between federal antitrust law and the several rationales for allowing
states and their subdivisions to displace competition.”).
160. See WOLFRAM, supra note 17, at 38 (“For almost a century after the federal antitrust laws were
first enacted, it was widely assumed that lawyers were exempt from their reach . . . . Anyone
adventuresome enough to speculate about the matter would probably have been unable to convince
many lawyers that the Supreme Court would apply the antitrust laws to them.”).
161. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791–92 (1975).
162. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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supervised” by the state.163 The approaches historically adopted by
various jurisdictions for applying the Midcal test fall loosely into three
categories: (1) the Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits look to a “cursory
approach” essentially eliminating the active supervision prong of
Midcal;164 (2) the First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits use an
“intermediate approach;”165 and (3) the Fourth Circuit follows the FTC’s
view in utilizing a “categorical approach,” applying both prongs of Midcal
vigorously.166 Private parties are exempt from antitrust liability when they
endeavor to influence the adoption or enforcement of anticompetitive
laws, a protection known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.167

163. Id. at 105.
164. See Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants of La., 139 F.3d 1033 (5th Cir. 1998)
(Louisiana’s state board of Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) prohibited registered CPAs from
“engaging in the practice of . . . ‘incompatible professions’” like selling securities and other actions.
Id. at 1034. The Court held that “[s]o long as the Board is acting within its authority and pursuant to
a clearly established state policy, there is no need for active supervision of the exercise of properly
delegated authority.” Id. at 1041. In order for the CPA Board to take advantage of state action
protection, the defendants had to “simply demonstrate that they acted ‘pursuant to state policy to
displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service’ that was ‘clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed.’” Id. at 1042.); Porter Testing Lab. v. Bd. of Regents for Okla. Agric. &
Mech. Colls., 993 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1993); Cine 42nd St. Theatre Corp. v. Nederlander Org., Inc.,
790 F.2d 1032, 1047 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the development corporation was presumed to be
public-interested because it was “by statute a political subdivision of the state”).
165. See Bankers Ins. Co. v. Fla. Residential Prop. & Cas. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 137 F.3d 1293
(11th Cir. 1998); Hass v. Or. State Bar, 883 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1989); Fuchs v. Rural Elec.
Convenience Coop., Inc., 858 F.2d 1210, 1217–18 (7th Cir. 1988) (“We hold that when an entity
charged with an antitrust violation is neither a municipality nor a state agency but does not have the
attributes of a purely private actor, it may be held immune as a state actor without the active scrutiny
of market conditions which is a necessary prerequisite for holding a private entity immune.”); FTC v.
Monahan, 832 F.2d 688 (1st Cir. 1987); Interface Group, Inc. v. Mass. Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9 (1st
Cir. 1987).
166. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 360 (4th Cir. 2013).
167. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) (“Joint efforts to influence
public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition.”);
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (“[T]he right to petition
extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one
aspect of the right of petition.”); see E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127, 135 (1961) (“[N]o violation of the [Sherman] Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to
influence the passage or enforcement of laws.”). The rationale for this immunity is based upon the
First Amendment’s protection of political speech. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head,
Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499 (1988) (scope of the protection depends on the “source, context, and nature
of the competitive restraint at issue”); McGowan & Lemley, supra note 149, at 297 (“[A]t least with
respect to requests directed at state legislators or those vested with state authority, the antitrust
immunity doctrines are ‘complementary expressions of the principle that the antitrust laws regulate
business, not politics; Parker protects the States’ acts of governing, and Noerr the citizens’
participation in government.’” (quoting City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S.
365, 383 (1991))).
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The U.S. Supreme Court most recently applied Midcal to restraints on
competition by state-created professional regulatory bodies in a challenge
by the FTC against the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners’s
practice of issuing cease-and-desist letters to non-dentists performing
teeth-whitening services.168 The FTC determined that the Board of Dental
Examiners violated antitrust law in issuing the letters, finding that the
Board acted as a group of private dentists rather than as a state actor, even
though it was an arm of the state.169 The Fourth Circuit agreed, applying
the full Midcal test, noting that “state agencies ‘in which a decisive
coalition (usually a majority) is made up of participants in the regulated
market,’ who are chosen by and accountable to their fellow market
participants, are private actors and must meet both Midcal prongs.”170 The
court found that the arrangement had no “active supervision” because the
Board consisted of dentists, a dental hygienist, and a member elected by
the state dental board.171
In a six-three decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth
Circuit.172 The majority assumed that the Board was a state agency and
that its actions were taken pursuant to a clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed policy.173 The decisive factor under Parker for
state action immunity, however, was whether the sovereign is acting to
implement its policies rather than being controlled by active market
participants.174 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, explained, “the
need for supervision turns not on the formal designation given by States
to regulators but on the risk that active market participants will pursue
private interests in restraining trade.”175 In other words, the Court found
that the Board effectively operated as a private body because a “majority
of the board’s members are engaged in the active practice of the
profession it regulates.”176
Significantly, the Court declined to consider whether a similar
limitation on antitrust immunity is warranted when the sovereign itself is
a member of the profession it regulates. It did, however, indicate that
168. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
169. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 368.
170. Id. (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 1A ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 227b, at 501 (3d ed. 2009)).
171. Id.
172. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1120.
173. Id. at 1110, 1121.
174. Id. at 1104.
175. Id. at 1114.
176. Id. at 1107.
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promulgation of rules alone is not sufficient to constitute supervision. To
be “actively supervised,” a politically accountable supervisor “must
review the substance of the anticompetitive decision, not merely the
procedures followed to product it,” “have the power to veto or modify
particular decisions to ensure they accord with state policy,” and “may not
itself be an active market participant.”177 Moreover, in addition to these
“constant requirements,” “the adequacy of supervision otherwise will
depend on all the circumstances of a case.”178
Relatedly, the opinion in North Carolina Dental Board leaves open
several questions relevant to this potential extension of the Court’s
holding. First, what constitutes an “active market participant” in the
regulated profession or “engaged in the active practice” of it?179 Does this
include retired members of the profession, or individuals trained in the
profession who have moved on to other careers? Second, how do we
define the relevant market? Third, how should we address intrinsic
concerns beyond economic regulation, such as “procedural due process,
official misconduct, and conflict of interest”?180
Ultimately, we do not yet know how the Court views regulation of
competition when the sovereign itself, as members of the regulated
profession, engages in the adoption, enforcement, and review of
anticompetitive state action. This is true whether the relevant market and
the meaning of active practice are defined narrowly or broadly.181 For
example, some might say that judges are not engaged in the “active
practice”182 of law; yet their membership in the legal profession and their
essential role in the practice of law raise the same sorts of concerns
underlying the majority opinion in North Carolina Dental Board.
Moreover, many judges, especially at the state level, will return to private
practice after a period of judicial service. Questions like these are likely

177. Id. at 1116–17.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1108, 1110.
180. Cirace, supra note 159, at 485 (“The use of a test with substantive elements in the narrow state
action area does not necessarily indicate the appropriateness of a substantive test for economic
regulation broad in impact or not displacing competition. State action cases, however, are not
concerned exclusively with substantive issues. Questions of procedural due process, official
misconduct, and conflict of interest are also inherent in these cases.” (citations omitted)).
181. The U.S. Department of Justice takes a fairly broad reading of this issue. See Statement of
Interest on Behalf of the United States of America at 11 n.4, TIKD Servs. LLC v. Fla. Bar, No. 1:17cv-24103 (S.D. Fl. Mar. 12, 2018), 2018 WL 3387406 (“Under Dental Examiners, state agency
officials need only practice in the ‘occupation’ regulated by the agency in order to be considered
active market participants. State officials need not be direct competitors of the plaintiff.”).
182. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1107.
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to come up again given the uncertainty left by the Court’s holding in North
Carolina Dental Board, as noted by Justice Roberts in his dissent.183
While some state bar associations proactively endeavored to reduce legal
exposure by altering their practices, most did not.184
C.

Should the State Action Exemption Apply to Anticompetitive
Restrictions Enacted by Members of the Regulated Group?

The analysis undertaken here applies whether the anticompetitive
regulatory actions are made by a body comprised of the regulated group’s
membership or directly by the sovereign itself. Though immunity for the
state acting as a sovereign is, admittedly, a relatively well-settled principle
in antitrust doctrine, I nevertheless question that assumption for the
purposes of this Article. The sovereign ought not be wholly exempt from

183. See id. at 1123 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (listing questions left by the majority opinion). Indeed,
in the months following the Court’s decision, two lawsuits soon followed. In June 2015, LegalZoom,
an online provider of legal forms and lawyer referrals, sued the North Carolina State Bar for violating
federal antitrust conspiracy laws, seeking an order requiring the State Bar to register LegalZoom’s
prepaid legal services plans so that they may be sold in North Carolina. See Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief at 21–22, LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011), 2011 WL 8424700. This case ultimately settled, but the questions it raised
still remain. LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N. C. State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111, 2015 WL 6441853 (N.C
Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 2015). The following month Express Lien, an online mechanics lien and
construction payment platform, sued the Ohio State Bar Association alleging that the Bar violated
antitrust law in “illegally and unreasonably restricting trade by accusing the [p]laintiff of the
unauthorized practice of law.” Complaint at 4, Express Lien, Inc. v. Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n, No.
2:15-cv-02519 (E.D. La. July 9, 2015), 2015 WL 4295032. This case also settled, and Express Lien
continues to operate in Ohio. See Order Dismissing Case, Express Lien Inc. v. Cleveland Metro. Bar
Ass’n, No. 2:15-cv-02519 (E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2016), 2015 WL 4295032. Nevertheless, inevitably,
courts will continue to be confronted with issues surrounding whether antitrust immunity should be
limited when members of the regulated group promulgate competitive constraints. For example, as
this Article goes to print, TIKD Services, LLC, a service matching individuals with parking tickets to
lawyers via a mobile app, is pursuing an $11.4 million antitrust suit against the Florida State Bar.
Carolina Bolado, DOJ Rebuts Fla. Bar’s Bid to Escape TIKD’s Antitrust Suit, LAW360 (Mar. 12,
2018, 5:25 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1021164/doj-rebuts-fla-bar-s-bid-to-escape-tikds-antitrust-suit (last visited Sept. 1, 2018). On March 12, 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a
Statement of Interest in support of TIKD. Statement of Interest on Behalf of the United States of
America, supra note 181.
184. For example, the Washington State Bar Association suspended the issuance of potentially anticompetitive advisory opinions. See Samson Habte, Washington Bar Suspends Ethics Opinions, Cites
Antitrust Fears, BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.bna.com/washington-bar-suspendsn57982065288/ [https://perma.cc/UT96-WPUS]. Similarly, though ultimately unsuccessful, the
North Carolina State Bar proposed legislation that would have required the state attorney general to
actively supervise any unauthorized practice of law actions that appeared to be anticompetitive. See
S.B. 353, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015); Ronald L. Gibson, An Update on Legislation
and Litigation, N.C. STATE BAR J., Summer 2015, at 5, 8.
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federal competition law when the sovereign is regulating itself, given the
inherent bias in this sort of arrangement.185
Consider the regulatory structure of the legal profession. When the
judiciary regulates its own profession in anticompetitive ways, is it
operating more like a governmental unit such as “a municipality, [where]
there is little or no danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing
arrangement”186 or more like a “private party . . . [where] there is a real
danger that [it] is acting to further [its] own interests, rather than the
governmental interests of the State”?187 Should the public be inherently
suspicious of rules enacted by government officials who are members of
the regulated profession, or should we give deference to them as insider
experts in their field? Does it matter whether members of the protected
group receive a financial benefit or other reward? If the officials are
accountable to the public through elections, does this ameliorate concerns
about self-interest? Are these the sorts of competition constraints
deserving immunity from antitrust scrutiny under the state action
doctrine? Or are these instances where the underlying principles
supporting state action immunity—for example the disinterested public
actor—are not present and thus should render the regulation subject to
antitrust review? Part III responds to these questions.
Part III of this Article offers a new recommendation—a specialized
antitrust review for regulations governing the practice of law to the extent
they are controlled by lawyers or lawyer-judges, a conclusion that may
follow for other professions as well.
III. APPLYING ANTITRUST LAW TO LAWYER-JUDGE
REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Antitrust law is a desirable mechanism for review of professional
regulations promulgated by state officials who belong to the regulated
profession for at least two reasons. First, courts are vulnerable to the
problems associated with capture as members of the profession they
regulate. Second, the First Amendment is an imprecise tool for
appropriately evaluating restrictions on competition. Relatedly, the free
speech doctrine arguably has been over-extended to address the
economics of competition causing unintended distortion in other areas of

185. See generally BARTON, supra note 136; CLIFFORD WINSTON, ROBERT W. CRANDALL &
VIKRAM MAHESHRI, FIRST THING WE DO, LET’S DEREGULATE ALL THE LAWYERS (2011); Edward
S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?: A Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment
in Law Firms, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1998).
186. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985).
187. Id.

10 - Knake.docx (Do Not Delete)

1330

10/10/2018 5:49 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1293

First Amendment jurisprudence. How, then, should courts limit antitrust
immunity in this context?
A.

A Proposal for Specialized Antitrust Review of Competitive
Constraints Enacted by the Regulated Group

Limiting antitrust immunity for judicial regulation of the legal
profession involves a number of considerations. Do we apply federal
antitrust law’s standard per se and rule-of-reason tests or do we apply a
modified antitrust review; for example, something similar to the “quicklook” analysis devised for collegiate athletics?188 The latter option—a
modified, consumer-based antitrust inquiry—likely works best. In short,
federal antitrust law should preempt anticompetitive lawyer regulation if
the rule “hurts consumers by impairing competition without solving some
serious market problem in a way beneficial”189 to the public or preserving
an essential element of law practice.
Thus, a court first would identify whether or not a challenged
regulation frustrates the competition goals of federal antitrust law.190
Second, if so, the court would look to see if the sovereign regulator is also
a member of the targeted profession. Third, assuming this is the case, the
court next would inquire whether the regulation preserves an essential
element of professional practice—e.g., the advice-giving and advocacy
roles of a lawyer, such as the rule governing the duty of confidentiality.
Fourth, the court, as a last step, would evaluate whether the regulation,
even if anticompetitive, nevertheless benefits the consumer. If not, the
regulation ought to be struck down. This consumer-driven focus mirrors
the U.S. Supreme Court’s articulated reasoning when it turned to the First
Amendment to strike down the advertising ban in Bates.
Under a test like this, Hoover v. Ronwin would have come out as Justice
Stevens advocated in his dissent,191 with Mr. Ronwin receiving his day in
188. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100–01, 109, 117 (1984) (proposing
a middle ground approach between per se and the rule-of-reason called the “quick-look” analysis to
be used when “no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character
of . . . an agreement” and where the restraint typically would be deemed illegal per se but “a certain
degree of cooperation is necessary”); see also Goldfarb vs. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17
(1975) (observing that the “public service” aspect of a competitive constraint “may require that a
particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another
context, be treated differently” (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
692 (1978))).
189. Wiley, Capture Theory: Reply to Professors Page and Spitzer, supra note 43, at 1336.
190. The Bates Court said as much, albeit grounded in the language of free speech. Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363–65 (1977).
191. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 587–88, (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that

10 - Knake.docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

10/10/2018 5:49 PM

THE LEGAL MONOPOLY

1331

court to prove whether the Arizona Supreme Court and bar authorities had
acted in the anticompetitive ways he alleged. Artificially capping the
number of competent lawyers admitted to practice in order to reduce
competition and maintain artificially high prices would, if proven, harm
consumers without resolving a market problem to the public’s benefit or
preserving a distinct aspect of the practice of law.
By contrast, one might argue that American Bar Association Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6192 governing confidentiality (which has
been adopted in most jurisdictions by state judiciaries) suppresses
competition by constraining the information an attorney may share about
details related to client matters. Perhaps if attorneys could use information
about pending cases as a marketing tool, more competition would exist
among legal service providers.193 But this rule protects a critical element
of the practice of law—the confidentiality an attorney owes to a client
during and after the representation and, as such, would not be invalidated
under the antitrust review proposed here.
Were courts to adopt the specialized antitrust review proposed here, a
number of questions remain. For example, who should assess the remedy?
Is it appropriate for lawyer-judges to supply the antidote to the very
anticompetitive lawyer regulations they themselves tailor? As a matter of
due process, perhaps federal jurisdiction should extend to challenges
involving state lawyer conduct rules to avoid having those who adopt the
rules determine their legality. What sort of remedy is best suited—the
Sherman Act’s automatic treble damages or injunctive relief or a
combination of both? I leave these questions for another day but
acknowledge that their resolution will be required should federal courts
begin to apply antitrust law more robustly to professional regulation as
contemplated here. Section III.B offers some preliminary insights on the
consumer’s perspective about how best to answer these questions.

while it may “seem highly improbable that members of the profession entrusted by the State Supreme
Court with a public obligation to administer an examination system that will measure applicants’
competence would betray that trust, and secretly subvert that system to serve their private ends[;]
[n]evertheless, the probability that respondent will not prevail at trial is no justification for dismissing
the complaint”).
192. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
193. Such a challenge on antitrust grounds is not entirely unlikely. See, e.g., Hunter v. Va. State
Bar, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1113 (E.D. Va. 2011) (holding on First Amendment grounds that attorney
could blog about successful representations including client names notwithstanding Rule 1.6
confidentiality protections).
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The Consumer Law Market as a Case Study

Does it matter whether the legal profession suffers from capture in
regulating itself? In the absence of the regulatory reform advocated for
here, the question is difficult to answer. Yet the plight for most Americans
in need of legal services cannot be ignored. How might lawyer-judgemade professional regulations matter for individual consumers of legal
services?
The consumer law market—i.e. those individuals who do not qualify
for legal aid and are unwilling or unable to pay for an attorney who
charges three-figures-an-hour for multiple hours194—has long been denied
affordable, accessible, widely-adopted legal services. According to some
estimates, this is as much as 80% or more of the American population.195
Every decade going back at least to University of Chicago Law Professor
Karl Llewllyn’s call in the 1930s for lawyers to “find[ ] the customer who

194. This definition of the consumer law market is similar to that of “middle-classes” as articulated
by George Harris and Derek Foran: “those individuals and households who are ineligible for publicly
supported legal services but have not yet accumulated capital sufficient to sustain a comfortable
lifestyle without maintaining their current income.” George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics
of Middle-Class Access to Legal Services and What We Can Learn from the Medical Profession’s
Shift to a Corporate Paradigm, 70 FORDHAM. L. REV. 775, 789 (2001) (footnotes omitted). This
encompasses most of the American public.
195. See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (2004) [hereinafter RHODE, ACCESS
TO JUSTICE] (“According to most estimates, about four-fifths of the civil legal needs of the poor, and
two- to three-fifths of the needs of middle-income individuals, remain unmet.”); Catherine R. Albiston
& Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101
(2013); Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice Through the
(Un)Corporate Practice of Law, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 43, 43 (2013) [hereinafter Hadfield, The
Cost of Law] (“The ordinary family obtains no legal help or advice with legal problems, muddling
alone through the crises of job loss, divorce, bankruptcy, immigration challenges, access to services
and benefits, injuries, and conflicts with neighbors or schools or health-care providers or local
officials. We live in a law-thick world that people are left to navigate largely in the dark.”); Rebecca
L. Sandefur, Money Isn’t Everything: Understanding Moderate Income Households’ Use of Lawyers’
Services, in MIDDLE INCOME ACCESS TO JUSTICE (Michael Trebilcock et al. eds., 2012); SANDEFUR,
ACCESSING JUSTICE, supra note 3; REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & AARON C. SMYTH, AM. BAR FOUND.,
ACCESS ACROSS AMERICA: FIRST REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING
PROJECT (2011),
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/access_across_america_first_report
_of_the_civil_justice_infrastructure_mapping_project.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JL6R-BAFY];
D. MICHAEL DALE, A.L. BURRUS INST. OF PUB. SERV. & RESEARCH, CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW
AND MODERATE INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN GEORGIA 27 (2009),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/delivery_legal_services/downloads/ge
orgia_legal_needs_study.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/A76Y-NJGF]; D. MICHAEL DALE,
LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN MONTANA 5 (2005); DENISE R. JOHNSON ET AL.,
COMM. ON EQUAL ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVS., REPORT ON INVESTIGATION OF NEED AND
ASSESSMENT OF RESOURCES 7 (2001).
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does not know he wants it and mak[e] him want it,”196 members of the
profession have bemoaned the plight of the average American who likely
does not even recognize that she has a problem with a legal solution, let
alone the requisite financial or informational resources to secure legal
assistance. Yet, no concrete regulatory reform has occurred over the years
in an effort to improve the competitive conditions for the consumer law
market. This failure is unlikely to self-correct absent fundamental market
restructuring.
Why has the American legal profession continued to ignore the needs
of the middle-classes over the past century? Several reasons exist. First,
the middle class lacks the sympathy of the poor.197 Second, those
attempting to provide low-cost legal services on a mass scale struggle to
build an economically-sustainable business model.198 Third, legal
education’s priority has always been preparation for entry into mid- and
large-sized law practice and, even with the modern emphasis on clinical
training, largely omits any meaningful training on service to the consumer
law market.
The problem is not one of demand—millions need legal help.199 The
problem is not one of supply—thousands of attorneys lost their jobs or
struggle to find their first in the twenty-first century’s upside-down legal
economy.200 The problem rests in asymmetrical information coupled with
high costs because the existing regulatory structure suppresses

196. K. N. Llewellyn, The Bar’s Troubles, and Poultices—and Cures?, 5 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 104, 115 (1938) (emphasis in original) (“[S]pecialized work, mass-production, cheapened
production, advertising and selling—finding the customer who does not know he wants it, and making
him want it: these are the characteristics of the age. Not, yet, of the Bar.” (emphasis in original)); see
also Elliott E. Cheatham, A Lawyer when Needed: Legal Services for the Middle Classes, 63 COLUM.
L. REV. 973, 973 (1963) (“The wide gap between the need and its satisfaction by the bar has been
indicated by numerous studies.”); Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A
Comparative Assessment of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 129, 133 (2010) (“[T]he bulk of civil legal services, and especially ex ante advisory services,
are ultimately provided to corporations rather than ordinary folks.”); Barbara A. Stein, Legal Services
and the Middle Class, 53 N.D. L. REV. 573, 580 (1977) (“[C]onsumer surveys demonstrate that the
economic suffering of attorneys derives not from a scarcity of need on the part of the public, but from
insufficient fulfillment of that need.”).
197. See generally Cheatham, supra note 196.
198. See RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 195, at 3 (providing a detailed overview of the
lack of legal services for poor and moderate-income individuals and proposing reforms); Susan Carle,
Re-Valuing Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 719, 722–23 (2001).
199. See Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing Legal Education, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1286
(2013).
200. Id. at 1284 (“The pervasive need for legal services is not because lawyers are unavailable; in
fact, law schools are graduating new attorneys at unprecedented rates, and thousands of licensed,
experienced attorneys are unemployed/underemployed.” (citations omitted)).
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competition and maintains artificially high rates. Making information
about law available through pro bono efforts and law-related education,
while laudable to be sure, has not been a sufficient solution. One of the
oft-cited arguments against liberalizing lawyer regulation is the
speculation that non-lawyer legal services are dangerous to the public, and
yet non-lawyer services are precisely what consumers demand.201
Given the legal profession’s historic treatment of the consumer law
market, one might be skeptical that meaningful legal representation will
ever be uniformly available to the mass public. Is it possible to
commoditize the legally-trained mind in a way where uniquely tailored
legal advice can be delivered through an economically-sustainable model
at a mass level? On the one hand, perhaps with the advent of modern
computer and mobile technology coupled with the potential for artificial
intelligence we now, finally, can harness cost-effective tools to perform
tasks that previously took a human attorney many hours to complete. On
the other hand, the profession witnessed similar technological revolutions,
for example the typewriter at the turn of the century,202 and these
innovations did little to alleviate the persistent consumer legal need.
What might a vibrant consumer law market look like? Consider this
proposal from nearly a century ago:
A group of capable young lawyers, on a salary and profit-sharing
basis under mature business and legal direction, could set a
precedent in specialized, low cost, large scale office organization.
Coupled with group publicity, such an experiment would be likely
to open up quickly considerable new business, and a method of
handling it.203
A significant barrier to this 1930s proposal for legal services in a mass
retail setting—considered a radical innovation then and still now—is a
lack of financial options for lawyers to invest in technology due to
201. See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law’s Information Revolution, 53 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1169, 1171 (2011) (“[The] traditional market for legal services is breaking down as lawyers
lose their monopoly over law-related services and must compete with alternative providers of similar
services.”).
202. See, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and
the Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147, 163–65 (1999) (noting the refusal of lawyers at prominent law firms
such as Cravath, Swain & Moore and Sullivan & Cromwell to adopt use of the telephone); Richard
L. Marcus, The Impact of Computers on the Legal Profession: Evolution or Revolution?, 102 NW. U.
L. REV. 1827, 1853 (2008); Michael Simkovic, The Economic Value of a Law Degree 36 (Harv. L.
Sch.
Program
on
the
Legal
Profession,
Paper
No.
2013-6,
2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250585
[https://perma.cc/53HA-B6JU]
(“Predictions of structural change in the legal industry date back at least to the invention of the
typewriter.” (citations omitted)).
203. Love et al., supra note 2, at 671.

10 - Knake.docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

10/10/2018 5:49 PM

THE LEGAL MONOPOLY

1335

anticompetitive lawyer regulation. Calls for reform to enable Internet and
technology-driven legal services for the consumer law market extend over
a decade, yet regulators have voluntarily done little to facilitate
competition.204 And it appears unlikely that any meaningful change will
come absent external force.205
To realize the benefits of modern technology and design for the
consumer law market, the legal profession must create a space for
innovation to occur. Innovation requires ideas, competition, and capital,206
all of which the existing regulatory structure for American law practice
restricts because of the ban on non-lawyer ownership and investment as
well as geographic practice restrictions.207 Innovation also requires input
204. See, e.g., Harris & Foran, supra note 194, at 805–06 (“Investments in technology by corporatebacked legal service providers would also allow for faster, more efficient, and more affordable service
to those consumers once the connection was made. Routine questions could be answered, and routine
services provided, largely through software technology, and consumers with more individualized
needs could be identified through the same technology. The technology is available, the need is
established, and the middle classes are on-line. What is missing are properly capitalized service
providers willing to make the necessary investment.”). The ABA has responded to the impact of
technology merely by incorporating an obligation to “keep abreast of changes in the law and its
practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology” into the explanatory
comments in Model Rule 1.1. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR. ASS’N
2014).
205. See Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. L.J.
1, 1 (2012) (suggesting that, if given the opportunity, the U.S. Supreme Court could address the issue
of non-lawyer ownership and investment much in the same way it did with the blanket ban on lawyer
advertising in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona); Ted Schneyer, “Professionalism” as Pathology: The
ABA’s Latest Policy Debate on Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Practice Entities, 40 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 75, 137 (2012) (“I was disappointed that the 20/20 Commission decided not to recommend our
proposal for adoption by the ABA House of Delegates . . . . [N]o relaxation of the ban on nonlawyer
ownership of law firms by the ABA or state supreme courts seems likely in the short term—unless,
of course, the ban is struck down in litigation.”).
206. See ROBERT D. COOTER & HANS-BERND SCHÄFER, SOLOMON’S KNOT: HOW LAW CAN END
THE POVERTY OF NATIONS 120 (2012) (“To produce innovations, money and ideas must come
together like the rings in Solomon’s knot.”); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 132–
33 (1982) (“The impossibility of any individual or small group conceiving of all the possibilities, let
alone evaluating their merits, is the great argument against central governmental planning and against
arrangements such as professional monopolies that limit the possibilities of experimentation. On the
other side, the great argument for the market is its tolerance of diversity; its ability to utilize a wide
range of special knowledge and capacity. It renders special groups impotent to prevent
experimentation and permits the customers and not the producers to decide what will serve the
customers best.”).
207. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation, supra note 30, at 1723 (“Innovation is not merely the
discovery of new ideas; it is the scaling up of those ideas into implementable organizations, systems,
products, equipment, and processes that generate economic value. Professional regulation of legal
markets significantly restricts the capacity for scaling up new legal ideas by limiting the potential to
exploit economies of scale and scope.”); Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 201, at 1218 (“[M]any
potential legal information innovations that are constrained by licensing laws [which] shows how the
rise of the legal information market intensifies arguments for reexamining lawyer licensing laws.”).
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and experimentation beyond the members of the profession itself.
Collaborative partnerships with non-lawyers are stifled by
anticompetitive rules prohibiting multi-disciplinary practice.
To fully (or even partially208) serve the unmet needs of the consumer
law market, lawyers “should be free to organize firms to pursue business
opportunities as they see fit and to select a form of governance from a
menu of legal alternatives.”209 This is a fundamental principle of
organizational liberty and “[b]y removing prohibitions and allowing
choice over organizational forms, economic liberty releases the energies
of entrepreneurs and sends innovation on its creative, unpredictable
path.”210 Other scholars have documented the economic inefficiencies of
lawyer regulation and lack of competition.211 Their work provides further
support for antitrust review of court-made lawyer regulation.
CONCLUSION
When members of a profession, acting as the state, regulate their
profession, the foundational assumptions underlying state action antitrust
immunity become compromised. That is especially true in the case of
lawyer-judge
regulation.
The
delegating
authority,
the
enactment/enforcement power, and the body reviewing constitutional
challenges to the regulation are all members of the legal profession,
whether lawyers or judges. To challenge the regulations, the case must be
pled to lawyers or lawyer-judges, often the very judicial body responsible
for enacting the rules in the first place. Even where these officials are
subject to some measure of public accountability through elections or an
appointment process, the fact remains that they are members of the very
profession subject to the regulations they create and administer.
It is true that the justificatory values of competition within the
profession may be partially vindicated via the First Amendment. Yet,
substituting the constitution for antitrust leaves an arbitrary gap in review,
where anticompetitive regulations not involving speech endure, even if
harmful to consumers. While the special duties of professionals, such as
lawyers, necessitate a different sort of test rather than that applied when
private actors engage in anticompetitive activity, this does not mean the
208. It may be that even with liberalization of the organizational/distribution rules what ails the
consumer law market will not be fully cured; but there is at least a portion of the latent market that
will be reached.
209. COOTER & SCHÄFER, supra note 206, at 136 (emphasis omitted).
210. Id.
211. See generally WINSTON, CRANDALL & MAHESHRI, supra note 185; Hadfield, Legal Barriers
to Innovation, supra note 30; Hadfield, The Cost of Law, supra note 195, at 43; Hazard, Pearce &
Stempel, supra note 55.
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professions should escape all review under the cover of state action
immunity. Rather, this Article calls for limiting antitrust immunity when
members of the regulated profession, acting as the state, design rules that
impair competition without curing a market problem to the public’s
benefit or preserving an essential element of professional practice. Doing
so promises to democratize access to legal services for the American
public.

